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Market Structure And Drug Innovation
Shifts in the ways markets and regulatory forces interact have brought
changes to drug innovation in the United States and elsewhere.
by Fabio Pammolli and Massimo Riccaboni
ABSTRACT: An explosion of knowledge and a growing array of tools and technologies have
transformed modern drug R&D, while its cost has risen by a sizable amount. At the same
time, the unchecked increase in health care and prescription drug spending has spawned
cost containment policies that are restricting the demand for drugs in all major markets.
This Perspective explores the interplay between technological advances and regulatory pol-
icies and their likely impact on the dynamics of the pharmaceutical industry.
A
dvanc e s i n the l i f e s c i e nc e s
have profoundly transformed the drug
research and development (R&D)
process. That transformation has come at a
price, boosting the cost of developing a new
molecular entity (NME) to $802 million by
2000.1 More expensive R&D, combined with
an aging population and better diagnostic
techniques, has swelled drug spending in the
United States, which reached $141 billion in
2001.2 These increases have in turn induced a
spate of cost containment measures that are
affecting demand for pharmaceuticals in all
major markets. This Perspective considers the
impact of the interplay between technological
advances and health care policy on the future
dynamics of the pharmaceutical industry.
 Productivity and growth. During the
1990s the U.S. pharmaceutical sector enjoyed
remarkable productivity growth, measured by
capital, labor, and total factor productivity
(TFP).3 Compared with Europe and Japan, the
United States has attained the highest average
growth in the value of pharmaceutical produc-
tion. This can be chiefly attributed to two
causes: First, there are strong differences in ab-
solute sizes and rates of growth between the
U.S. market and those of other countries. For
instance, the U.S. pharmaceutical market has
grown from being roughly equal to the Euro-
pean market at the beginning of the 1990s to
being almost twice as large in more recent
years.4 Second, the U.S. industry has been able
to respond to market dynamics through sub-
stantial growth in nonlabor inputs, such as re-
search and capital.
How much of this increase is structural and
how much is transient is an important ques-
tion, at a time when growth seems to be abat-
ing. To a certain extent, productivity in phar-
maceuticals will increase, as in other sectors,
as a pure consequence of economic recovery,
since firms have already reduced the share of
personnel costs devoted to production value.
Moreover, consolidation through mergers and
acquisitions, together with a further diffusion
of information and communication technol-
ogy, can further fuel growth in productivity. In
particular, substantial gains in efficiency can
likely be achieved by redesigning and reorga-
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nizing distribution channels, to adapt them to
the growing roles of buyers’ groups and the
Internet. However, in the long run, productiv-
ity and pharmaceutical innovation will be crit-
ically affected by the interplay between tech-
nological and demand dynamics.
 Application of new disciplines. The
past twenty-five years have witnessed a revo-
lution in biological sciences, with basic
advances in molecular and cell biology, bio-
chemistry, protein and peptide chemistry,
physiology, and pharmacology. The applica-
tion of these new disciplines to the drug in-
dustry, together with the growing conver-
gence between life sciences and information
sciences, has had an enormous impact on
R&D activities, on the organizational capabili-
ties needed to discover and develop new drugs,
and on the dynamics of industry evolution.5 By
most metrics used in pharmaceutical discov-
ery and development, output per person-hour
has risen impressively over the past fifteen
years. Yet this has not yet had a measurable im-
pact on the flow of new drugs. There can be
several reasons for this paradox: On the one
hand, as scientists gain an increasingly de-
tailed understanding of pathological processes
at the molecular level, they can formulate
better hypotheses that avoid dead-end tracks.
On the other hand, as more targets are discov-
ered, the body of knowledge required to un-
derstand them, let alone use them for new
therapies, increases dramatically, which delays
the time when new or better therapies become
available. In short, there can be sharply dimin-
ishing returns in drug R&D.
The balance between these two opposing
trends will eventually tilt to the side of in-
creased productivity, but this might be years
away and, moreover, is critically dependent on
regulation, demand, and the pricing of new
products. In short, pharmaceutical R&D for
complex pathologies might be facing sharply
rising marginal costs, but the price/value of
those drugs tends to be higher and higher (so-
cially). It is not uncommon for a new target to
require many years of painstaking discovery to
sort through the divergent conjectures and re-
search hypotheses, which reflect the uncer-
tainty, irreversibility, and lock-in of pharma-
ceutical R&D.6 Since geneticists have recently
increased our supply of targets from several
hundred to several thousand, the magnitude of
the work required to turn this into drug inno-
vation cannot be underestimated.
In fact, the task at hand is so momentous
that a spontaneous division of labor in R&D
has emerged that unites the traditional large
pharmaceutical companies to thousands of
“small pharmas” and public research institutes
in complex, dynamic webs in which knowl-
edge, assets, and technological know-how are
traded.7 This provides the flexibility necessary
to accommodate an exploding body of knowl-
edge and to match opportunities with capital
and know-how. It is apparently already pro-
ducing tangible gains in R&D productivity,
since both the probability of success and the
speed of development are higher for collabora-
tive versus in-house R&D projects.
 Industry structure and evolution. Com-
petition dynamics in pharmaceuticals results
from the market interaction of breakthrough
products, imitative (“me-too”) compounds that
offer various degrees of incremental improve-
ment, and generics.8 Breakthrough molecules
enjoy rapid growth until imitative products are
introduced and slow the growth of the innova-
tive drug. After a while, all drugs tend to grow
at about the same rate, with highly asymmetric
shares in favor of the early entrants.9
Interestingly, innovation is highly specific
to indications, biological targets, and chemical
families and is not easily transferred to other
families or targets, even within the same thera-
peutic area or the same company. For instance,
firms with solid franchises in selective sero-
tonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) or statins
have been unable to parlay these strengths into
leadership of newer modes of action, which
would have helped refresh their franchises as
they matured. More often than not, a com-
pany’s franchise becomes extinguished with
the expiration of the blockbuster patent that
created it. There does not seem to be a durable,
long-term first-mover advantage that can be
exported to a different drug class. This has
hindered the persistence of dominant posi-
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tions and limited industry concentration.
In summary, growth and industry structure
in pharmaceuticals are driven by two basic
mechanisms: the creation of new markets
through the introduction of new families of
products and rare arrivals of major break-
throughs, and competition among products
within each submarket, before and after pat-
ent expiry. Against this backdrop, it is easier to
understand why some cost containment initia-
tives recently implemented or under study
across the world could permanently and ad-
versely affect competition in the industry. For
example, convergence toward price-control
schemes such as reference pricing for on-
patent drugs within broad equivalency classes
would reduce expected revenues from hori-
zontal product differentiation and would rein-
force first-mover advantages, which would in
turn lead to higher concentration. In this sce-
nario, fewer of the giant firms would survive.
Survivors would be companies that succeed in
retooling their innovation to produce a consis-
tent flow of first-in-class breakthrough drugs
(instead of “me-too” compounds). Other com-
petitors would gradually lose their status as
growth companies that can be relied upon to
deliver consistent growth and profits. They
would in effect become cyclical drug compa-
nies, whose fortunes would follow the cycles
of their (rare) blockbusters. As cyclical compa-
nies go, their valuation would be severely pe-
nalized and would likely attract corporate
raiders bent on unlocking their intrinsic value
by taking over those firms and selling off the
pieces. Industry concentration would in-
crease. A few biotech companies might seize
the opportunity to join the ranks of Amgen
and Genentech, and some might pair off with
like-minded larger drug firms to become spe-
cialist drug companies. But the financial vul-
nerability of both the large cyclical and the
biotech firms would be a barrier to growth. In-
novation in pharmaceuticals is influenced by
market size and expected profitability, which
are sensitive to regulation.10
All in all, international convergence toward
price control and reference pricing for innova-
tive drugs would have negative effects on in-
dustry structure and innovation. A new indus-
try landscape would take shape, but one that
might look quite different from what policy-
makers originally had in mind.
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